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SECTOR ALLOCATION: A MISGUIDED SOLUTION 
Shannon Carroll* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 9, 2010, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)1 
issued Amendment 16 to the New England Multispecies2 (groundfish) 
Fishery Management Plan, implementing what is known as “sector 
allocation.”3  In its simplest form, sector allocation is a method of 
allocating fishing privileges—the ability to harvest fish—to individual 
groups of fishermen, who are then able to use, buy, or sell those 
privileges.4  Sector allocation is a radical departure from traditional 
management practices in New England, and, after nearly three decades of 
pervasive overfishing, increasingly Draconian fishing regulations, and 
ongoing legal battles, it has the potential to signal a positive new 
direction for the New England groundfish fishery.5  
                                            
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1. The National Marine Fisheries Service is now known as NOAA Fisheries Service; 
however, as a matter of consistency, this Comment will continue to refer to the Service as 
NMFS.  
 2. The term “multispecies” refers to a stock of twelve species of bottom-dwelling 
fish, including, most notably, cod and haddock.  Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight 
Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on its Conservation 
Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 579, 581 (2004). 
 3. 2010 Sector Operations Plans and Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,113, 18,113 (Apr. 9, 
2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).  
 4. Id. 
 5. See Daniel S. Holland & Joshua Wiersma, Free Form Property Rights for 
Fisheries: The Decentralized Design of Rights-Based Management Through Groundfish 
“Sectors” in New England, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1076, 1076-80 (2010).  See generally 
ROBERT J. JOHNSTON & JON G. SUTINEN, PEW ENV’T GRP., ONE LAST CHANCE: THE 
ECONOMIC CASE FOR A NEW APPROACH TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND 14 
(2009) [hereinafter ONE LAST CHANCE], available at http://www.pewenvironment.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/Johnston_Sutinen_2009.pdf (detailing empirical 
support for sector allocation in the New England Groundfish fishery).  
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Sector allocation fits within the broader category of “catch share” 
fishery management programs.6  NMFS defines “catch share” as “a 
general term for several fishery management strategies that allocate a 
specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to individuals, 
cooperatives, communities, or other entities.”7  Generally, catch share 
programs contain two elements: (1) an output control—an annual limit 
on the total number of fish that can be harvested in a fishery, commonly 
referred to as the “total allowable catch”; and (2) a transferable allocation 
of that fishery’s annual catch limit to individual fishermen or vessels, 
commonly referred to as “quota.”8  
Catch shares are part of “a global movement” in fisheries 
management toward a market-based approach to regulation and are 
deeply rooted in economic perceptions of property rights, efficiency, and 
stewardship.9  Accordingly, the theory behind catch shares is twofold: 
the use of output controls allows fisheries managers to directly limit fish 
mortality, while the allocation of transferable quota—in effect a quasi-
property interest—to individual fishermen incentivizes efficiency and 
stewardship through ownership of fishing privileges.10    
The success of catch share programs is well documented.11   
Although each individual program is unique, catch share programs have 
been implemented in over one hundred different fisheries worldwide.12  
By and large, the evidence demonstrates that catch share programs 
effectively control overfishing, reduce overcapitalization of the fishery 
(generally through consolidation), and increase profits for remaining 
                                            
 6. See NOAA FISHERIES OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY i (2010) [hereinafter CATCH SHARE 
POLICY], available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/ 
draft_noaa_cs_policy.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. SETH MACINKO & WILLIAM WHITMORE, A NEW ENGLAND DILEMMA: THINKING 
SECTORS THROUGH 13-14 (2009), available at http://www.uri.edu/personal/macinko/ 
NewEnglandDilemmaFinal.pdf; CATCH SHARE POLICY, supra note 6, at i.  
 9. Id. 
 10. See COMM. TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 33 
(1999) [hereinafter SHARING THE FISH]. 
 11. See, e.g., Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries 
Collapse?  321 SCIENCE 1678, 1678-81 (2008) (chronicling the success of catch share 
programs worldwide).  
 12. Individual Fishing Quota Act of 2001: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 107th Cong. 49 (2001) (statement of Jon G. Sutinen, 
Professor, Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of 
Rhode Island).   
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participants.13  Thus, there is little question as to the effectiveness of 
catch share programs as a fishery management tool.14 
That success raises several issues, however.  Catch share programs 
promote economic efficiency by creating a tradable market for quota.15  
Almost inevitably, this entails consolidation of a fishery’s participants.16  
But because the markets for quota are artificially designed by fisheries 
managers, the way in which managers initially allocate quota and dictate 
how that quota can be bought or sold becomes a determinative factor in 
how quickly and to what degree that consolidation occurs.17  Not 
surprisingly, in fisheries with a diverse array of participants, such as the 
New England groundfish fishery, building broad support for catch share 
programs is difficult.18  
Catch shares raise other socioeconomic concerns as well.  The 
individual allocation of fishing privileges alters the traditional 
perspective of viewing the seas as “commons”—a notion that still 
resonates with coastal New England fishing communities.19  Moreover, 
concerns over the consolidation of fishing effort and the perceived 
privatization of a public resource often elicit visceral reactions from 
fishermen, politicians, and community members who fear the loss of 
economic opportunity and cultural heritage from their region.20  These 
                                            
 13. Id. at 49-50. 
 14. See, e.g., MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 46.  
 15. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 33-34.  
 16. See id. at 34-35. 
 17. See MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 36-37. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The description of fishing grounds as commons is derived from Garret Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons essay.  Fishery regulators have increasingly limited access to 
fishing grounds, which has been a major cause of friction in New England, where open 
access is viewed as part of the New England fishing tradition.  See, e.g., Operations of 
the Regional Fishery Management Councils and the Reauthorization of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Resources, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Francis W. Blount, Jr., Chairman, New 
England Fishery Management Council) [hereinafter Blount Statement] (noting the 
extreme political volatility of limiting access in New England).  As will be discussed 
below, the implementation of the sector program is a further departure from this open 
access tradition because, in effect, it allocates not just access, but a percentage of the total 
catch to individuals.  See infra Part II.  
 20. See Blount Statement, supra note 19 (“[F]ishery participants in New England 
consider [catch shares] an extremely sensitive issue and a very real threat to fishing 
communities and small boat fleets.”). 
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concerns have spawned significant debate as to whether the benefits of 
catch share programs outweigh their potential problems.21   
Sector allocation is billed as an innovative solution to the issues 
raised by catch share programs, as well as an answer to the chronic 
overfishing of groundfish in the Gulf of Maine, for two reasons.22  First, 
sector allocation is a voluntary management program.23  Fishermen may 
choose to continue fishing under the existing regime, which regulates 
catch through limits on days-at-sea, or opt to join the sector program.24  
Second, the sector program shifts the burden of determining quota 
allocation and implementing consolidation safeguards from the 
government to the fishermen.25  Sector members negotiate allocation 
through contractual agreements and are free to impose limits on 
consolidation of quota through those agreements; therefore, the design of 
the market structure is almost entirely up to the fishermen.26  Thus, on its 
face, the sector program maintains the benefits of a traditional catch 
share program (e.g., strict limits on fish mortality and increased 
economic viability) while providing flexibility for fishermen and fishing 
communities to find workable solutions to some of the more systemic 
problems of catch share programs (e.g., control over allocation and the 
rate at which consolidation occurs).    
This Comment advances the debate over catch share programs by 
considering whether sector allocation represents a potentially promising 
new direction for fisheries regulation.  To do so, Part II explores the legal 
and historical framework that has set the stage for sector allocation and 
explains why fisheries managers in New England had little choice but to 
adopt the sector program.  Next, Part III argues that sector allocation is 
an imperfect response crafted to accommodate a number of well-
intended but poorly conceived legal constraints and, therefore, is not a 
promising innovation.  Part IV concludes by recommending a modest 
reform to the sector program, while specifically addressing how the legal 
framework for catch share programs at the national level could be 
                                            
 21. See, e.g., RÖGNVALDUR HANNESSON, THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE OCEANS 147 
(2004). 
 22. See generally ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5.  
 23. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,262 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); see also ONE LAST CHANCE, 
supra note 5, at 17-18.  
 24. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,263.  
 25. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 14-15. 
 26. 2010 Sector Operations Plans and Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,113, 18,113 (Apr. 9, 
2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
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redesigned to retain its positive features while ameliorating some of its 
problems.   
II.  THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT FOR SECTORS 
A.  Closing the International Commons—The 1976 Magnuson- 
Stevens Act 
For hundreds of years, the groundfish stocks off of New England’s 
coast comprised one of the world’s greatest fisheries.27  Basque and 
Viking fishermen routinely fished these waters long before the arrival of 
Christopher Columbus,28 and “[f]our centuries of New England history, 
culture and economic development [were] grounded in the harvest of 
halibut, cod, haddock, and other fish.”29  Before 1977, when the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act went into effect, federal jurisdiction 
of fisheries resources was limited to twelve nautical miles from shore.30  
The waters beyond federal jurisdiction were considered the high seas—
an international commons with no governmental body or international 
agreement regulating the extraction of fisheries resources.31  
Given the fecundity of the resource, few before the twentieth century 
believed that the groundfish fishery could be overfished.32  However, 
with the arrival of technologically advanced foreign vessels to the Gulf 
of Maine in the 1960s, it soon became apparent that even the great 
groundfish fishery was vulnerable to overfishing.33  As a result, the 
fishing industry lobbied for the exclusion of foreign vessels from 
                                            
 27. Fleming et al., supra note 2, at 581. 
 28. MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 
19-21, 24 (1997).  
 29. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 3.  
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 29 (1975). 
 31. Id. at 26.  
 32. KURLANSKY, supra note 28, at 32.  Indeed, biologist Thomas Huxley made the 
now ominous remark, “[I believe] that the cod fishery . . . and probably all the great sea 
fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say, nothing we can do seriously affects the number 
of the fish.”  QUENTIN BONE & RICHARD H. MOORE, BIOLOGY OF FISHES 454 (3d ed., 
2008).  
 33. The first technologically advanced Russian fishing vessels began harvesting 
groundfish from Georges Bank in 1960.  PETER B. DOERINGER ET AL., THE NEW ENGLAND 
FISHING ECONOMY: JOBS, INCOME, AND KINSHIP 17 (1986).  Subsequently, hundreds of 
foreign vessels began exploiting New England’s offshore fishing grounds, and by 1972, 
the efforts of American fishermen accounted for only ten percent of the total harvest 
taken from Georges Bank.  Id. 
168 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
offshore waters.34  Congress was receptive, blaming “the intense foreign 
effort” for the depletion of the nation’s fish stocks.35  Viewing both the 
biological depletion of the Gulf and the “old” and “inefficient” fishing 
fleet present in the United States as symptoms of “a common property 
resource,”36 Congress passed the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act (now commonly known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
(MSA)) in 1976, extending federal jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles and 
excluding foreign vessels from within that boundary.37 
The MSA established “[a] national program for the conservation and 
management of fisheries resources in the United States” with the express 
purposes of “prevent[ing] overfishing, . . . insur[ing] conservation, . . . 
[and] realiz[ing] the full potential of the Nation’s fishery resources.”38  In 
addition to extending federal authority to 200 nautical miles from the 
U.S. coast,39 the MSA delegated regulatory authority to NMFS,40 through 
the Secretary of Commerce.41  The MSA also established eight Regional 
Fishery Management Councils as part of “a bifurcated decision-making 
process for managing fishery resources within the EEZ . . . .”42  Each of 
the eight councils holds authority over a geographic region and is 
charged with reflecting the “expertise and interest of the several 
constituent States” within that region.43  While councils perform a variety 
                                            
 34. Id. at  26. 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 30 (1975). 
 36. Id. 
 37. DOERINGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 26; see also Rita Heimes, Managing A 
Fishery Through Contract: Legal Issues Raised By Sector Operating Agreements in the 
New England Multispecies Fishery, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 17, 17-18 (2008).  More 
accurately, foreign vessels are only authorized to fish within U.S. EEZ if the particular 
fishery is under utilized.  16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006).  
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6).  
 39. Id. § 1811(a) (the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)).  Notably, states still retain 
jurisdiction over the waters within three geographical miles from shore.  43 U.S.C. § 
1301(a)(2) (2006). 
 40. More accurately, the MSA charges the Department of Commerce with authority to 
implement the Act.  However, in practice NOAA, delegating through NMFS, acts as the 
primary regulatory authority. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEWING ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS 9 (2005). 
 41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851, 1854.  
 42. George J. Mannina, Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual 
Fishing Quotas? 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 7 (1997).  
 43. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(2). The eight regions are: New England (Maine, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut); Mid-Atlantic (New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina); South 
Atlantic (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida); Gulf of Mexico (Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida); Caribbean (U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico); 
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of functions, their primary purpose is to prepare a fishery management 
plan (FMP) for each fishery under federal jurisdiction.44  The FMP is the 
“foundational” regulatory framework, providing the basic regulations 
and policies that govern the fishery.45  All FMPs must be consistent with 
the provision of the MSA.46  Once developed, the council must submit 
the FMP to NMFS for approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval.47  If 
a council  wishes to modify an existing FMP, it may do so by 
promulgating an amendment to the FMP.48  Amendments to the FMP 
must meet the same legal standards as the original FMP.49  
B.  The Problem with Traditional Fisheries Management 
The implementation of the MSA did little to alter traditional fisheries 
management approaches.  Under a traditional fisheries management 
regime, managers rely on input controls—designed inefficiencies—to 
control fish mortality.50  Input controls typically include gear restrictions 
(e.g., minimum mesh size for nets), vessel restrictions (e.g., limits on the 
size or capacity of fishing vessels), and license limitations (e.g., 
restriction on the number of licenses issued), all of which are designed to 
indirectly control fish mortality.51  However, rather than achieving a 
sustainable harvest, input controls almost always lead to problems of 
overcapitalization and overfishing.52  
Generally, input controls fail for two reasons.  First, input controls 
do not directly control the level of fish mortality; rather, input controls 
dictate the level of fishing effort allowed to occur—directly, through trip 
                                                                                                  
Pacific (California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho); North Pacific (Alaska, Washington, 
Oregon); Western Pacific (Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands).  
Id. § 1852(a)(1)(A)-(H). 
 44. Id. § 1852(h)(1).  
 45. Scott C. Matulich et al., Policy Formulation Versus Policy Implementation Under 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Insight from the 
North Pacific Crab Rationalization, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 240 (2007). 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(C).  
 47. Id. § 1854(a)(3); Mannina, Jr., supra note 42, at 8. 
 48. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 49. Id.  
 50. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
290 (2004) [hereinafter OCEAN BLUEPRINT]; see, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, 
at 115.  
 51. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 115.  
 52. Neal D. Black, Note, Balancing the Advantages of Individual Transferable Quotas 
Against Their Redistributive Effects: The Case of Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 9 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 727, 729-31 (1997). 
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limits, or indirectly, through gear restrictions and shortened seasons.53  
As a result, fisheries managers are effectively forced to predict the level 
of catch per effort, leading to a great deal of uncertainty and regulatory 
flux within the fishery.54  Second, input controls create an incentive for 
fishermen to invest in more advanced vessels and gear.55  As managers 
aim to make the fishery less efficient, fishermen set out to make their 
harvest more efficient.56  The result is an overcapitalized fishery, with 
fishing effort exceeding biological limits.57  In turn, managers are forced 
to constantly amend fishing regulations, resulting in regulatory flux.58   
Similarly, the primary method of output controls imposed under 
traditional fisheries management regimes—a total allowable catch (TAC) 
limiting the amount of fish that may be harvested during a fishing 
season—further exacerbates the problems of overcapitalization and 
economic inefficiency.59  Namely, when a TAC is imposed as the sole 
output measure (known as a stand-alone TAC), rather than individually 
allocated through a catch share program, the “race for the fish” becomes 
increasingly more competitive.60  This phenomenon occurs because 
under a stand-alone TAC, the fishery closes once the TAC is reached; 
thus, instead of racing against the biological limits of the fishery, 
fishermen must now compete against each other for individual shares of 
the TAC. 61  As in a fishery managed under input controls, fishermen are 
given an incentive to invest in more advanced vessels and gear, leading 
to further overcapitalizing of the fishery.62  In turn, the race for the fish 
leads to shorter seasons, as the capacity of the fleet increases while the 
                                            
 53. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 6.  
 54. Id. at 9.  
 55. Id. at 6.  
 56. See Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable Quotas and the Magnuson Act: 
Creating Economic Efficiency in Our Nation’s Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
267, 299 (1996). 
 57. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE 
DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 5-6 (Lee G. Anderson & 
Mark C. Holliday eds., 2007) [hereinafter DESIGN OF LAPPS]. 
 58. Id.  In the Northeast groundfish fishery, the futility of these controls is well-
documented.  Until the adoption of the sector allocation program, the New England 
Fishery Management Council primarily managed effort, and thus fish mortality, by 
limiting both the number of entrants to the fishery and the number days a vessel could 
spend at sea.  Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1077.  Yet even as fisheries managers 
reduced days at sea and implemented additional input controls, groundfish landings 
continued to increase and fishing mortality regularly exceeded overfishing thresholds.  Id.   
 59. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 287. 
 60. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 14. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 14-15. 
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TAC remains stagnant.63  In the most extreme cases, fishing seasons are 
compressed into a matter of minutes.64  Additionally, stand-alone TAC 
fisheries augment “supply gluts” in the market, a phenomenon that not 
only has an adverse effect on market prices for fishermen, but also for 
fish quality and supply for processors, dealers, and ultimately 
consumers.65  Thus, while TACs are successful in controlling fish 
mortality—if set at the correct level—they are not successful in 
promoting an economically viable fishery.    
A condensed history of the management of the New England 
groundfish fishery demonstrates these failures of traditional fisheries 
management.  Following the passage of the MSA in 1977, the New 
England Fisheries Management Council (the Council) inherited a 
groundfish fishery that was left depleted by foreign vessels.66  Initially, 
the Council began regulating the fishery through the use of quotas 
(stand-alone TACs) and input controls (minimum mesh and fish size 
limits).67  However, as national fleet capacity increased over time, the 
Council quickly abandoned quota-based regulations, viewing such 
measures as a hindrance to growth.68  Although groundfish stocks 
initially showed signs of recovery, this phenomenon was largely 
attributed to the absence of foreign fishing pressure,69 and, as the 
domestic fleet expanded, the downward biological trend continued.70  In 
1986, the Council implemented more restrictive input controls (again, 
minimum mesh and fish sizes) with the promulgation of the Northeast 
Multispecies FMP.71  The Council’s restrictions proved ineffective, 
                                            
 63. See e.g., id.  
 64. For example, British Columbian herring fishermen reached the fishery’s annual 
TAC eight minutes into the season.  Polly Ghazi et al., Our Plundered Seas, THE 
OBSERVER (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1995, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REVIEW, June 1, 1995.   
 65. REDSTONE STRATEGY GROUP & ENVTL. DEF., ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR 
LAPPS IN U.S. FISHERIES 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter REDSTONE]. 
 66. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 275.  
 67. Madeleine Hall-Arber, Co-Management at the Eleventh Hour? Participation in 
the Governance of the New England Groundfish Fishery, in 4 REVIEWS: METHODS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES 141, 145 (2005).  
 68. Steven A. Murawski, The New England Groundfish Resource: A History of 
Population Change in Relation to Harvesting, in THE DECLINE OF FISHERIES RESOURCES 
IN NEW ENGLAND: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OVERFISHING, CONTAMINATION, AND 
HABITAT DEGRADATION 11, 16 (Robert Buchsbaum et al. eds., 2005).   
 69. William E. Robinson & Judith Pederson, Contamination, Habitat Degradation, 
Overfishing - An “Either-Or” Debate?, in THE DECLINE OF FISHERIES RESOURCES IN NEW 
ENGLAND: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OVERFISHING, CONTAMINATION, AND HABITAT 
DEGRADATION 1, 1-3 (Robert Buchsbaum et al. eds., 2005).   
 70. Id. at 1.    
 71. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145. 
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largely as a result of increased fishing effort within the confines of the 
existing regulatory framework,72 and in 1989, the Council declared 
several of the stocks overfished, leading again to more restraining 
regulations that also failed to end overfishing.73   
In 1991, the Conservation Law Foundation sued the Department of 
Commerce and the Council, alleging that they had failed to prevent 
overfishing as mandated under the MSA and its corresponding 
regulations.74  The Conservation Law Foundation specifically cited the 
inability of input controls to reduce fish mortality.75  The suit led to the 
implementation of Amendment 5 to the Multispecies FMP and, as a 
result of warnings of the “imminent collapse of Georges Bank cod,” to 
emergency closures of parts of the Gulf of Maine.76  The crux of the 
Amendment 5 regulations, however, was imposition of a limited entry 
system, which effectively closed access to new entrants, and a days-at-
sea program, which limited the number of days-at-sea a vessel could 
fish.77  
Amendment 5, like its predecessors, proved unsuccessful in 
controlling fish mortality and groundfish stocks continued to decline.78  
In 1996, the Council adopted Amendment 7, which limited the days-at-
sea program, tightened daily catch limits on the fishery, and restricted 
mesh size of trawling nets.79  Over the next several years, the Council 
promulgated additional amendments and “framework adjustments”80 
imposing significant cuts to the days-at-sea program and introducing a 
buyback program to reduce fleet capacity.81  
By 2001, the Multispecies groundfish FMP had been altered more 
than thirty times, with limited success.82  The Conservation Law 
                                            
 72. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 287. 
 73. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145. 
 74. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 1. 
 75. Murawski, supra note 68, at 17.   
 76. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 2.  NOAA scientists warned: “Failure to 
take strong management actions now to preserve the limited spawning biomass for [the 
Gulf of Maine] cod may have severe and potentially long-lasting consequences for both 
the stock and fishery.”  Murawski, supra note 68, at 17. 
 77. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 8.  
 78. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 1-2. 
 79. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145. 
 80. A framework adjustment is a change to the existing FMP that requires fewer 
procedural steps than an amendment and is therefore used to implement regulatory 
changes quickly, during the fishing season.  See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40, at 
15. 
 81. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145. 
 82. Id. at 146.  
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Foundation filed a second lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the 
rebuilding plans implemented by NMFS and the Council were not 
sufficient to end overfishing.83  The second suit led to the development of 
Amendment 13, which aimed to “address stock rebuilding issues, greatly 
reduce fishing effort and capacity in the multispecies fishery and 
implement additional measures to specifically address habitat 
protection.”84  Among other input restrictions, Amendment 13 severely 
restricted the allowable days-at-sea for fishermen in the fishery.85  
However, the drastic measures imposed under Amendment 13 also failed 
to end overfishing, setting the stage for the sector initiative.86  
Thus, the history of the New England groundfishery demonstrates 
the failures of the status quo.  The Council’s reliance on input controls 
failed to effectively reduce fish mortality, in part because the Council 
was politically unable to introduce regulations that were stringent 
enough, and in part because of the inherent inability of input controls to 
directly affect fish mortality. 87  
C.  The Rise of the Catch Share Solution 
The failures of the New England groundfish fishery are not unique.  
As fish stocks throughout the country continued to decline during the 
1980s, Regional Fishery Management Councils struggled to impose 
regulations that effectively controlled fish mortality.88  Traditional 
management methods locked regulators and fishermen in a cyclical battle 
that required increasingly “Draconian command-and-control measures” 
in order to achieve any semblance of conservation.89  Consequently, in 
this context of management failure and subsequent economic and 
biological decline, fisheries managers began experimenting with market-
based quota programs.90   
The theory behind market-based quota programs was not new.  Since 
the 1950s, many fisheries economists have argued for a property-rights 
                                            
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. DANIEL S. HOLLAND, GULF OF ME. RESEARCH INST., COMMUNITY-BASED SECTORS 
FOR THE NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISH FISHERY 8 (2007). 
 86. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,292 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
 87. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 275, 287. 
 88. Id.  
 89. REDSTONE, supra note 65, at 4-6. 
 90. See, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26. 
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solution to the problem of overfishing.91  As managers began recognizing 
the increased role of markets and economic factors “in protecting 
environments and managing natural resources,” incorporating these 
concepts into fisheries management seemed like a logical outgrowth.92  
In practice, at least from a global perspective, these approaches also were 
not new.  Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Iceland 
began experimenting with market-based programs beginning in the late 
1970s, with significant success.93  However, because market-based 
programs ran counter to what was seen by many as a “freedom to fish,” 
these ideas struggled to take hold in the United States until the early 
1990s.94  
As support for market-based programs gained traction in the United 
States, managers began experimenting with individual fishing quotas 
(IFQs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs).95  Under an IFQ 
regime, fisheries managers allocate a specific amount of quota—usually 
a percentage of the TAC—to each eligible fisherman.96  In turn, this 
quota can be harvested, bought, sold, or leased by the quota holder or 
other entities.97 
Today, the breadth of market-based programs has expanded beyond 
IFQs.98  In order to capture this diversity under a single term, NMFS 
refers to such programs as “catch shares.”  As discussed earlier, NMFS 
defines “catch share” as “a general term for several fishery management 
strategies that allocate a specific portion of the total allowable catch to 
individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities.”99  Put more 
directly, catch shares provide the benefits of output controls (a hard limit 
on the level of fish mortality in the form of a TAC) while reducing the 
incentive to race for the fish by allocating a portion of that TAC to an 
individual, community, or group.100  
                                            
 91. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property 
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POLITICAL ECON. 124, 132-33 (1954). 
 92. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26. 
 93. Id. at 26-32. 
 94. Id. at 26. 
 95. Id.  The term IFQ and ITQ are often used interchangeably, with IFQ being the 
more common term in the United States.  The technical difference between the two is that 
IFQs could, in theory, include some type of non-transferable permit; however, in practice 
there is little distinction between the terms.  For the purposes of this Comment, the term 
IFQ will encompass ITQs.  See, e.g., DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 1. 
 96. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 288. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 1. 
 99. CATCH SHARE POLICY, supra note 6, at 3. 
 100. See id. 
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Catch share programs have several general advantages over 
traditional fisheries management approaches.  Most notably, catch share 
programs are effective at curbing overcapitalization of the fishery.101  
When TAC is individually allocated, as is the case with most catch 
shares, fishermen are no longer compelled to race for the fish;102 
consequently, there is less economic incentive to invest in larger vessels 
and advanced technology.103  Likewise, markets and consumers benefit 
by receiving a higher quality product that is delivered throughout the 
year, instead of in short windows correlating with fishing seasons.104  
Additionally, safety and gear conflicts typically decline because quota 
owners have greater flexibility in dictating both the type of weather and 
the speed in which they harvest fish.105  Finally, proponents argue that 
catch shares provide greater incentives for stewardship and 
sustainability.106 
Conversely, several common issues arise from the implementation of 
catch share programs.  As noted above, catch shares are a useful tool to 
improve the efficiency of a fishery.107  In practice, however, this usually 
means consolidating the number of participants in the fishery.108  Thus, 
one of the fundamental problems that fisheries managers face in the 
designing of catch share programs is determining “just the right number 
of people” for the fishery—a process that inherently requires a degree of 
social engineering and judgment.109  Hence, the process by which the 
initial allocation of fishing privileges is determined raises many issues of 
fairness.110  In turn, catch shares often reduce the number of crew 
                                            
 101. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. 
 102. For example, the length of the Alaskan halibut fishery expanded from 3 to 245 
days after the introduction of IFQs.  TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 113-14 (2001).  
 103. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 6. 
 107. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. 
 108. DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 8. 
 109. Id.  
 110. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.  To a certain degree, the success of and 
support for catch share programs is derived from the argument that market forces will 
“determine the right number of people.”  MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 47-48.  
However, because catch share programs are artificially created markets—they are created 
and designed by fisheries managers—the decisions about how a catch share program will 
operate ultimately require determining winners and losers.  Id.  For example, the way in 
which managers initially allocate quota affects the rate of consolidation.  Id.; SHARING 
THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.  If managers use an individual’s catch history to determine 
initial allocation (the most common practice), then factors such as the duration of the 
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positions available and increase entry costs for new participants because 
consolidation reduces the number of vessels participating in the 
fishery.111   
In addition to economic and social criticisms, observers also question 
whether catch shares promote environmental stewardship within the 
fishery.112  Specifically, critics note that catch share programs may 
incentivize environmentally destructive practices such as 
“highgrading”—a practice in which fishermen, seeking to fill their quota 
with the highest-value fish possible, discard less valuable fish.113  
Beyond the practical arguments, the push for catch share programs 
can be viewed as an outgrowth of traditional Western economic and 
political thought, “where markets are the source of efficiency and, 
ultimately, of economic growth and social welfare.”114  Indeed, from an 
economic perspective, the problem, and therefore the solution, is fairly 
straightforward.  Through the economic lens, the “fisheries problem” is 
one of a lack of property rights: because the individual fisherman has no 
property interest in the fish he does not catch, the individual fisherman 
has no vested interest in the future of the fishery.115  Accordingly, as the 
fishery becomes increasingly competitive due to more entrants and/or 
fewer fish, fishermen invest in more technologically advanced boats and 
equipment.116  Consequently, the fishery becomes dramatically 
overcapitalized to the point where the cost of fishing effort rises as the 
biological integrity of the fishery declines.117  Thus, economic theory 
suggests that the solution to a lack of property rights is the 
implementation of a property rights system.  
                                                                                                  
catch history sample and the period from which that sample is taken directly favor certain 
individuals over others.  MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 47-48; SHARING THE 
FISH, supra note 10, at 4.  Likewise, the limits that managers place on the trading and 
selling of quota affect the rate and degree of consolidation.  MACINKO & WHITMORE, 
supra note 8, at 47-48; SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.  In the Alaskan halibut 
fishery, for instance, quota ownership is restricted by vessel length (e.g., a fisherman with 
a sixty-five foot vessel may only harvest quota assigned to that vessel class).  
Consequently, the rate and degree of consolidation is limited because, as a practical 
matter, quota transferability is not fluid.  See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.  
 111. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. 
 112. Katrina Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private 
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 160 (2005). 
 113. Id.  
 114. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26. 
 115. Gordon, supra note 91, at 130-31. 
 116. Id. at 133. 
 117. Id.; see also SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE 
ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 36-38 (1999). 
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However, viewing the success of catch shares solely through an 
economic lens oversimplifies and mischaracterizes the problem of 
traditional fisheries management.  First, as a matter of law, catch shares 
are not, nor have they ever been a property right.118  Instead, catch shares 
are an allocated privilege granting access to the fish, not a right to the 
fish themselves.119  Moreover, these privileges may be revoked “at any 
time.”120  Thus, the success of catch share programs is not caused by the 
creation of a property right in a fishery because, as a matter of law, no 
property right exists.121  Rather, the success stems from the ability to 
implement a TAC—a strict limit on fish mortality—while rationalizing 
the fishery through the assignment of privileges in a way that maintains 
economic, and to a lesser degree, social stability.122  On the surface, the 
distinction appears to be little more than semantics; however, much of 
the hostility to catch shares, particularly in New England, stems from 
their characterization of catch shares as a property right.123  Thus, in 
order to further the debate regarding the use of catch shares, it is 
important to precisely define why they succeed.  
D.  The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996—A Moratorium on Catch 
Shares 
As the number of catch share programs grew in the United States, so 
did the division between proponents and opponents of the program: 
What occurred in the [catch share] fisheries in the first half of the 
1990s strengthened the forces both for and against putting other 
fisheries in the United States under [catch share] regimes. To 
many these developments seemed a resounding success. The 
industry became more efficient, fishing effort was reduced, the 
fishing season became longer, and the fish was turned into a 
more valuable product. The time seemed ripe for applying this 
regime to other fisheries in the United States. Others saw 
undesirable consequences, or regarded as negative effects that 
others viewed as positive.  Concentration of quotas in fewer 
hands, higher price of quotas and barriers to entry, more supplies 
into the fresh fish market and less processing, decline in 
                                            
 118. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (2006).  
 119. DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 5.  
 120. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(2).  
 121. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 48.  
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 54-55.  
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employment of fishermen and their wages; these were viewed by 
some people as undesirable and not to be repeated in other 
settings.124   
Responding to the polarizing opinions, Congress amended the MSA in 
1996, placing a four-year moratorium on the application of catch shares 
in U.S. fisheries, in anticipation of a three-year study by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) analyzing the effectiveness of the catch 
share program.125  Although the report ultimately recommended that 
Congress lift the ban, the debate over catch share programs raged on, 
leading to a two-year extension of the moratorium in 2000.126  
In 1999, the NAS published its findings.  The three-year study 
ultimately concluded that:  
[Catch shares] should be allowed as an option in fisheries 
management if a regional council finds them to be warranted by 
conditions within a particular fishery and appropriate measures 
are imposed to avoid potential adverse effects.  The issues of 
initial allocation, transferability, and accumulation of shares 
should be given careful consideration when [catch share] 
programs are considered and developed by regional councils and 
reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce.127 
Additionally, the NAS study noted several generalized outcomes of catch 
share programs.128  First, the report concluded that catch share programs 
significantly reduce the size of the fleet in a catch share managed 
fishery.129  For example, after IFQs were implemented in Alaska’s 
halibut and sablefish fisheries, the fleet sizes decreased by forty-two 
percent and fifty-two percent respectively.130  Consequently, the report 
noted that the decrease in vessel numbers led to greater profits amongst 
those remaining in the fishery.131  Second, the report found that longer 
fishing seasons typically ensued, as the race for fish under a TAC 
management approach was removed.132  However, the NAS report also 
found several generalized adverse effects.  Notably, the report found that, 
                                            
 124. HANNESSON, supra note 21, at 147. 
 125. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 289.  See also Sustainable Fisheries Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 108(d)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3559, 3576 (1996) (repealed 2002).  
 126. HANNESSON, supra note 21, at 151. 
 127. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 5. 
 128. Id. at 99. 
 129. Id.   
 130. Id.  
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in addition to decreased employment within the fishing sector, a 
significant power shift had occurred from deckhands to vessel/permit 
owners. 133 
E.  The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act of 2006—A 
Compromised Solution to Catch Share Implementation 
Ironically, the congressionally mandated moratorium on catch share 
programs spurred interest in their development.134  Likewise, the 
recommendations by the NAS in 1999 helped to push the issue back onto 
the congressional stage.135  The array of House-and-Senate-proposed bills 
and subcommittee meetings in the period following the moratorium 
indicate both the politicization of the issue as well as the seriousness with 
which Congress set about looking for a solution.136  When Congress 
began work on the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA) in 
2005, the issue of catch shares was front and center.  The result is the 
addition, in section 303A to the MSA, of a set of national guidelines for 
catch share programs.137  
From a national perspective, section 303A represents a hard-fought 
compromise on the catch share debate.  Drawing heavily on the 
recommendations of the NAS and a corresponding report by the U.S. 
Ocean Commission,138 section 303A sets forth a voluminous list of 
guidelines and is meant “to be as comprehensive as possible in 
                                            
 133. The report attributed the cause of the power shift “to the generation and ownership 
of new economic value reflected in [catch shares] and to the fact that ownership of 
originally issued [catch shares] is generally concentrated among vessel owners, rather 
than the crew or processing sectors.”  Id. at 103.  Put another way, catch share programs 
allocate fishing privileges only to vessel or permit owners, effectively precluding 
consideration of a crewman’s historic involvement in the fishery.  See id.  Thus, 
vessel/permit owners are allocated a financial stake in the fishery that typically has 
market value, whereas crewmen are afforded no such consideration.  This fact has 
particular significance when a fishery undergoes consolidation.  See id.  Vessel/permit 
owners who exit the fishery are able to sell or lease their quota and thus receive an 
economic benefit from the consolidation.  See id.  Conversely, crewmen forced to exit the 
fishery are provided no such benefit.  See id.  
 134. SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FISHERIES? 1 
(2002); see also Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1076.  
 135. See S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 9 (2006) (noting the reliance on the NAS report 
findings). 
 136. See Fishing Conservation and Management Amendments Act of 2004, S. 2066, 
108th Cong. § 11(a) (2004); Fishing Quota Act of 2003, S. 1106, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1) 
(2003); Fishing Quota Standards Act of 2003, H.R. 2621, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2003).  
 137. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (2006).  
 138. Id.  
180 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
describing the rules governing the implementation of [catch shares].”139  
For example, section 303A establishes eligibility restrictions on quota 
ownership,140 provides safeguards for the initial allocation quota,141 and 
places a cap on the total amount of quota an individual or entity may 
own.142  Additionally, section 303A mandates that fishery managers 
“consider the basic cultural and social framework of the fishery,” while 
giving particular consideration to the “sustained participation of small 
owner-operated fishing vessels and fishing communities that depend on 
the fisheries.”143  Thus, in its entirety, section 303A establishes numerous 
procedural and substantive measures meant to soften the disruptive social 
and economic effects of catch shares.  
Importantly, section 303A still affords the Regional Fishery 
Management Councils a significant level of deference in the actual 
design of the catch share program itself.144  The allowance for flexibility 
at the Regional Fishery Management Council level is fundamental to the 
design and implementation of a successful catch share program.145  Both 
the NAS and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy reports emphasize 
that the needs for each fishery are unique and that a standardized catch 
share program will not be effective.146  Indeed, “an approach that 
balances the benefits of regional flexibility with the need for a national 
policy [on catch shares]” was an explicit goal of the legislation.147  Thus, 
section 303A establishes protective measures to ameliorate the negative 
                                            
 139. Peter Schikler, Comment, Has Congress Made it Harder to Save the Fish? An 
Analysis of the Limited Access Privilege Program (LAPP) Provisions of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 908, 919 (2008). 
 140. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(D).  
 141. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A). 
 142. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(D). 
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Allocation and the Magnuson-Stevens Act at the Roger Williams University School of 
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 145. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 195; OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 
290. 
 146. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 194-95; OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 
290. 
 147. S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 9 (2006). 
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side effects of catch share programs while allowing the Regional 
Councils the flexibility to adopt a program that incorporates those 
protective measures.   
Yet, from a New England perspective, section 303A significantly 
hinders that flexibility by creating a referendum requirement specific to 
the New England Regional Council.148  The referendum requirement 
prohibits the New England Regional Council from submitting “a fishery 
management plan or amendment that creates an individual fishing quota 
program . . . unless such a system, as ultimately developed, has been 
approved by more than 2⁄3 of those voting in a referendum among 
eligible permit holders.”149    
The referendum requirement is a bit of a paradox.  On the one hand, 
it reflects the apprehension among New England politicians, fishery 
managers, and fishermen of the possibility of implementing a catch share 
program.150  Citing fears of the economic consequences of consolidation 
and an end to a “traditional” way of life, particularly for smaller-scale 
fishermen, representatives from the region expressed hesitation about 
section 303A’s ability to protect fishermen from the negative effects of 
catch share programs.151  Accordingly, it was included to protect those 
interests from being saddled with an unwanted catch share program.152  
However, given the seemingly inherent controversy surrounding the use 
of catch share programs and the diverse array of fishing interests 
represented in the New England groundfish fishery, the prospect of the 
Council proposing a catch share program that meets the approval of all 
permit holders is unlikely.  Thus, the practical effect of the referendum 
                                            
 148. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i). 
 149. Id.; see also Schikler, supra note 139, at 923 (noting that the Council will likely be 
“hamstrung” by the referendum requirement). 
 150. Schikler, supra note 139, at 923. 
 151. For example, George LaPointe, Commissioner of the Maine Department of 
Marine Resources testified: 
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Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 15 (2005) 
(statement of George LaPointe, Comm’r, Maine Department of Marine Resources); see 
also Blount Statement, supra note 19.  
 152. Schikler, supra note 139, at 924-25.  
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requirement is to either exclude catch shares as an option or to bind the 
Council into developing a catch share program outside of the section 
303A requirements.  
F.  The Amendment 16 Process 
In 2006, the Council began drafting Amendment 16 to the Northeast 
Multispecies FMP.  By that time, the legal framework and political 
culture surrounding fisheries management had shifted dramatically.  
While the plethora of amendments and framework adjustments that 
preceded Amendment 16 occurred in a climate of legislative indifference 
or opposition toward catch shares, Congress had implicitly, if not 
explicitly, signaled its support for catch shares through section 303A.153  
On a national level, the establishment of guidelines for catch share 
programs had tilted the political scales in favor of such programs.154  
Moreover, for the first time, Congress had included amendments to the 
MSA that mandate the implementation of TACs and impose strict 
deadlines to end overfishing.155  Lastly, there was at least a semblance of 
agreement between fisheries managers and fishermen that the status quo 
was not working for the New England groundfish fishery.156 
From the outset, the Council faced a tough mandate to end historic 
overfishing.  Revisions were necessary under Amendment 13 in order to 
meet specific biological benchmarks for groundfish stocks by 2009.157  
The revisions required were severe.  Because eleven groundfish stocks 
were classified as “subject to overfishing” and eleven stocks were 
“overfished,” the Council was required to “adopt rebuilding programs” 
that addressed those stocks and “revise management measures necessary 
to end overfishing, rebuild overfished groundfish stocks, and mitigate the 
adverse economic impacts of increased effort controls based upon the 
results of [recent stock assessments].”158  In addition, new amendments to 
the MSA, including the requirement that annual catch limits (TACs) and 
                                            
 153. See supra Part II.E.  See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (2006) (authorizing the use 
of catch share programs).  
 154. See MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 17 (noting the increase in support for 
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 155. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3).  
 156. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 20. 
 157. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,262 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
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accountability measures for each overfished stock be implemented by 
2010, imposed additional mandates on the Council.159  
Accordingly, both Council members and fishermen were aware that 
Amendment 16 would lead to further restrictions on effort in the 
fishery.160  Under the prevailing management system, which relied 
primarily on days-at-sea and other input controls, additional effort 
reduction would have resulted in a dramatic reduction in the economic 
viability of the fishery.161  Consequently, “there was increased interest in 
alternative management approaches that would improve [the] economic 
viability” of the fishery, while allowing the Council to meet its goals 
under Amendment 16 and the requirements of the MSRA.162 
Limiting the available alternative approaches, however, was the 
requirement that the Council impose TACs for all overfished stocks by 
2010.163  Similar to input controls, stand-alone TACs augment 
overcapitalization and lead to decreases in the economic sustainability of 
the fishery.  Further, as a result of the rebuilding efforts mandated under 
the MSRA and Amendment 13, the TAC for the fishery would be too 
small to support the fleet at current levels of effort under the days-at-sea 
program.164  Thus, given that “[p]ast experiences with [stand-alone 
TACs] have shown that they are fraught with problems that are difficult 
to solve,” the Council did not view a stand-alone TAC as an option.165 
Not surprisingly, the Council viewed a catch share alternative as the 
best solution to maintain economic efficiency in the fishery while 
meeting the requirements of the MSRA.166  In fact, the groundfish fishery 
displayed all the classic signs of a fishery ripe for such a program.  The 
fishery was overfished, overcapitalized, and straddled with a complex, 
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multifarious array of effort controls.167  Simply put, the fishery was 
neither biologically nor economically viable.168  
However, regulatory-imposed deadlines complicated the matter; the 
Council was required to meet a 2009 deadline to implement “necessary 
revisions” to the groundfish FMP and a 2010 deadline to implement a 
TAC on all overfished stocks.169  Yet, the MSRA also required that the 
Council, in passing any IFQ or similar catch share program, receive the 
support of two-thirds of all permit holders through a referendum.170  
Given the historic opposition to catch share programs and the lack of 
support for one specific catch share option, the Council did not believe it 
could meet the regulatory deadlines and obtain the necessary votes to 
pass the referendum.171  
Indeed, the Amendment 16 process indicates that the Council viewed 
the referendum as a significant obstacle in meeting the deadlines 
mandated by the MSRA.  For example, while IFQs and a “points system” 
were discussed as options during 2006 and early 2007,172 both IFQs and 
the points system alternatives were removed from consideration within 
months of the passage of the MSRA.173  As noted in the 2008 Draft Final 
Environmental Impact Statement:  
The Council decided not to pursue an [IFQ] proposal because 
recent changes to the [MSA] impose a requirement for an 
industry referendum before an [IFQ] can be implemented.  The 
Council does not believe there is enough time available to 
develop a proposal and complete the referendum in time for . . . 
[the] implementation date.174 
Thus, by eliminating the range of alternatives the Council could consider, 
the referendum requirement had a binding effect on the Amendment 16 
process. 
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pounds of fish.”  Id.  The Council, based on guidance by NMFS, ultimately concluded 
that the points system was legally indistinguishable from IFQs and would therefore 
trigger the referendum requirement.  Letter from Patricia Kurkul, Reg’l Adm’r, Northeast 
Regional Office, NOAA Fisheries, to New England Fisheries Mgmt. Council (June 18, 
2008) [hereinafter Kurkul Letter] (on file with author); Christel, supra note 161. 
 174. AMENDMENT 16 DEIS, supra note 165, at 23. 
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Such an effect undermines the purpose of the national catch share 
guidelines.  Section 303A is intended to provide the Council with 
flexibility in its ability to modify existing FMPs through the use of catch 
share programs.175  And while section 303A is meant to establish 
boundaries for the Council, nothing in the MSRA or the bill’s legislative 
history indicates that Congress meant for the section’s requirements to be 
outcome-determinative on the Council’s process.  Yet, analysis of the 
Amendment 16 process reveals that, somewhat paradoxically, the 
referendum did become outcome-determinative.  By inserting the 
referendum requirement into section 303A, Congress was attempting to 
protect New England fishermen from being forced into an unwanted 
catch share program.  However, the combined effect of the MSRA’s 
mandated annual catch limits, the deadlines imposed by Amendment 13, 
and the referendum requirement was to limit the range of alternatives 
that the Council could consider.   
As a result, members of Council, and thus fishermen, were faced 
with a stark alternative: maintain the status quo or develop a catch share 
program that is exempt from the referendum requirement.   
III.  THE SECTOR PROGRAM: AN INNOVATIVE OR IMPERFECT SOLUTION? 
The Council’s response to the bind created by the referendum 
requirement and mandatory deadlines was to create two management 
regimes for the New England groundfish fishery: a status quo, input-
based fishery, and a voluntary catch share alternative—sector 
allocation—not subject to the referendum requirement or the national 
guidelines under section 303A.  This section analyzes the details of the 
two management alternatives and explains why the sector program is an 
imperfect solution to a confounding problem.   
A.  The No-Alternative Alternative—Sector Allocation and the “Common 
Pool” 
1.  Sectors  
Simply put, sectors are a form of group fishing quota, as opposed to 
individual fishing quota.  The sector program allocates a percentage of 
the fishery’s TAC to individual sectors.176  Each sector is made up of 
                                            
 175. Kurkul Symposium, supra note 144.  
 176. As codified in the groundfish FMP, a “sector” is defined as:  
a group of persons holding limited access NE multispecies permits who have 
voluntarily entered into a contract and agree to certain fishing restrictions for a 
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fishermen who have voluntarily entered into a contract with one 
another.177  Individual fishermen are allotted a catch history; in turn, the 
sector’s TAC is the aggregate of each sector member’s catch history.178  
To that end, sectors are self-selecting, self-forming, and, to a certain 
extent, self-governing.179  Each sector retains the right to choose its 
members.180  Likewise, the decision to join a sector is that of the 
individual fishermen; sector membership is not required under 
Amendment 16.181  Once a permit holder enters a sector, the permit 
holder and the sector must come to a contractual agreement as to the 
permit holder’s share of the sector’s TAC.182  This is a distinctive feature 
of the sector program—without membership, sectors have no allocation 
of the annual catch limit; conversely, without joining a sector, a 
fishermen’s catch history is worthless.183  Thus, there is a symbiotic 
relationship between the sector and the permit holder.  An additional 
distinguishing factor between sector program and traditional catch share 
programs is the presence of joint and several liability for regulatory 
infractions (e.g., if one member exceeds the sector’s TAC, all sector 
members must cease fishing).184 
2. The “Common Pool”  
The second alternative for fishermen is known as the “common 
pool.”185  Fishermen in the common pool are allowed to harvest the 
remaining portion of the fishery’s annual catch limit that is not allocated 
to the sectors.186  Unlike the fishermen fishing under the sector program, 
common pool fishermen fish under a days-at-sea restriction; thus, they 
                                                                                                  
specified period of time, and that have been allocated a portion of the TACs of 
species managed under the NE Multispecies FMP to achieve objectives consistent 
with the applicable goals and objectives of the FMP.  50 C.F.R. § 648.2 (2010).   
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  Generally, an individual’s catch history consists of his or her historical 
landings from 1996-2006, but this period may vary based on the specific type of permit 
held.  Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 18,276 
(Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
 179. See 50 C.F.R. § 648.2. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at 18,267; see also MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 13. 
 182. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 12.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1078.  
 185. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,267 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
 186. Id. at 18,268. 
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are subject to the many problems associated with input controls.187  For 
this reason, many fishermen sardonically refer to the common pool as the 
“cesspool,” and membership in the common pool is significantly lower 
than that of the sector program.188 
B.  The Legal Basis for Sectors 
In approving Amendment 16, the Council, relying on legal advice 
from NMFS, determined that the sector program did not fall within the 
section 303A requirements because the program did not meet the legal 
definition of IFQ or “limited access privilege program” as defined under 
the MSRA.  Understanding the legal rationale for sectors will, in turn, 
help demonstrate that sectors are not the innovative solution they are 
touted to be, but, rather, a cleverly crafted program designed to evade the 
referendum requirement and still comply with legal requirements.  
The Council and NMFS’ justification for excluding sectors from 
section 303A rests on the fact that there is no direct allocation of quota 
under the sector program.189  The MSRA defines an IFQ as “a Federal 
permit under a limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish, 
expressed by a unit or units representing a percentage of the total 
allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or held for exclusive 
use by a person.”190  Under the sector program, there is no direct 
allocation of quota to the permit holder (the fisherman or vessel owner); 
instead, a catch history is issued to the permit holder, which, in turn, may 
be pledged towards the sector’s allocation of TAC.191  Because the sector 
is a voluntary contractual arrangement between fishermen, “there is no 
Federal permit issued to the ‘sector’ per se.”192  Thus, the symbiotic 
relationship between the sector and the permit holder becomes a crucial 
distinction in this legal justification.  Sectors serve as the “vehicle” for 
allowing fishermen to receive their allocation of personal catch history; 
                                            
 187. Id.; see also MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 13. 
 188. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 45.  Although the precise number is 
difficult to ascertain, due to inactive permits, it is estimated that more than ninety percent 
of active groundfish fishermen joined the sector program.  Beth Quimby, New Rules, 
Same Struggle: Staying Afloat, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 3, 2011, 
http://www.pressherald.com/news/new-rules-same-struggle-staying-afloat_2011-04-
03.html.  
 189. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,292. 
 190. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23) (2006).  
 191. See supra Part III.A.  
 192. Kurkul Letter, supra note 173.  
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but, in separating the quota allocation from the permit, sectors remain 
outside of the definition of IFQ and limited access privilege.193 
C.  Benefits of the Sector Program 
As of May 2011, the sector program will have been in operation for 
one year.  For that reason, it is difficult to know what the long-term 
effects of the program will be.  To be sure, the program in New England 
has already produced several “on the ground” advantages.  From a 
biological standpoint, the imposition of a TAC on the fishery allows 
managers to directly control fish mortality.194  And, although the 
determination of TAC can be a heavily politicized process, thus far the 
Council has imposed stringent quotas on many of the overfished 
stocks.195  Moreover, because sectors are jointly and severally liable for 
overfishing their quota, sectors and sector fishermen have a strong 
incentive to remain within their quota limits.  Indeed, in the first year of 
the sector program, no sector exceeded its quota.196   
Likewise, from a fisherman’s perspective, the sector program 
provides immediate advantages as well.  First and foremost, sectors 
provide fishermen with the flexibility to “experiment with alternative 
management approaches and to adjust management with relative ease.”197  
In practice, this means that fishermen are not bound to a strict IFQ-style 
quota system.  Instead, individual sectors may, and in fact do, assign and 
trade quota in a variety of different ways.198  One sector, for example, has 
created a quasi-IFQ system, allowing free trade of quota between 
members.199  In contrast, another sector, in Maine, does not individually 
allocate quota, instead allowing members to competitively fish for that 
sector’s TAC.200  Additionally, sectors provide fishermen with many of 
the advantages of traditional catch share programs, such as more 
flexibility in the time in which fishermen choose to harvest their allotted 
catch, greater marketing opportunities, higher market prices, and, in turn, 
a better economic return from the fishery.201   
                                            
 193. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,296.  
 194. See supra Part II.C.  
 195. Quimby, supra note 188.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1079.  
 198. Interview with Jonathan Labaree, Collaborative Fisheries Strategies Program 
Manager, Gulf of Me. Research Inst., (Mar. 24, 2011) (notes on file with author).  
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1080; Quimby, supra note 188.  
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D.  Criticism of the Sector Program 
Although at first glance the sector program seems to be an innovative 
solution to a difficult problem—ending overfishing in the groundfish 
fishery while providing the flexibility to appease a wide-range of 
participants and meet strenuous legal requirements—sectors remain an 
imperfect response for two major reasons.  First, the sector program has 
no significant safeguards to protect against excessive quota allocation or 
consolidation.  Second, providing fishermen with the option of the 
common pool leaves them with a Hobson’s choice, and, thus, no 
alternative to the sector program.   
1.  Protections Against Excessive Consolidation and Quota Allocation 
The primary problem with the sector program is that it contains no 
cap on quota allocation.  As originally proposed, the program limited 
quota allocation to twenty percent of the fishery’s TAC;202 however, the 
final rule contains no cap, allowing for unrestrained accumulation of 
quota.203  This raises several issues.  As discussed above, the TAC 
imposed under Amendment 16 was set at a low level.204  Indeed, much of 
the push for the sector program was based on the rationale that the 
fishery could not function at the low levels under the existing regulatory 
system.  Yet, even under the sector program, the low catch limits are 
likely to be too small to support the current number of fishery 
participants.205  Thus, it is widely acknowledged that the sector program 
will result in accumulation of quota and some degree of consolidation.206  
The major concern, however, is that with the TAC set at such low levels, 
excessive consolidation will occur, leading to a “lack of diversity in the 
groundfish fleet.”207  
                                            
 202. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,296 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Northeast Multispecies Fishery; Notice of a Control Date for the Purpose of 
Limiting Excessive Accumulation of Control in the Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; 
NE Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP), 76 Fed. Reg. 19,305, 19,306 (Apr. 7, 
2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).   
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  Although a detailed discussion of the importance of diversity in a fishing fleet 
is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that a diverse fishing fleet 
provides a number of benefits.  These benefits include, but are not limited to: economic 
benefits from a wider-range of economic activities spread throughout a variety of fishing 
communities; the preservation of cultural heritage and community values; and ecological 
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Additionally, the cost-sharing framework of the sector program 
augments the likelihood of excessive consolidation.  The costs of 
maintaining the sector program, like any catch share program, are 
extensive.208  These costs primarily include monitoring and enforcement 
costs and are surprisingly large, particularly in the case of the sector 
program, which encompasses a wide geographic area.209  Recognizing 
the costs associated with catch share programs, Congress, in section 
303A, capped NMFS’ ability to shift this burden onto fishermen by 
including a cost-recovery limit of three percent of the total ex-vessel 
value of the fishery.210  The sector program, however, is not subject to a 
cost-recovery cap and the costs borne by fishermen are estimated to be as 
high as twenty percent of ex-vessel value.211  Indeed, under the sector 
program, fishermen are responsible for funding one hundred percent of 
the mandatory reporting and monitoring costs.212  And, although NMFS 
has agreed to fund some of these costs until 2012, these costs will 
significantly impact the economically marginal fishermen in the fleet, 
particularly small-boat operators,213 a group that Congress explicitly 
aimed to protect through section 303A.214 
Perhaps the most troubling issue with the lack of allocation and 
consolidation safeguards in the sector program is that there is little legal 
recourse for affected groups.215  The omission of an allocation cap 
appears to run afoul of current statutory and regulatory provisions.  
National Standard Four of the MSRA provides that any allocation of 
fishing privileges must be “carried out in such manner that no particular 
individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of 
such privileges.”216  Similarly, the groundfish FMP mandates that the 
                                                                                                  
benefits from diversity of fishing method, location, and target species.  Brett Tolley, 
Policy Advocate, Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance, Testimony Before the New 
England Fishery Mgmt. Council on Excessive Fleet Consolidation and the Impact to the 
Marine Ecosystem 4 (Sept. 30, 2010) (transcript on file with author).  
 208. Labaree, supra note 198.  
 209. Id. 
 210. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(e), 1854(d)(2)(B).  
 211. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 31.  Ex-vessel value refers to the price 
fishermen receive for their fish.   
 212. See Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 
18,297 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); see also Holland & Wiersma, 
supra note 5, at 1080; Quimby, supra note 188. 
 213. Kurkul Symposium, supra note 144.  
 214. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(5)(B)(i).  
 215. See City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-10789-RWZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70895 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011).  
 216. Id. § 1851(a)(4).  
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Council and NMFS maintain fleet diversity.”217  However, because of the 
way that the Council bifurcated the quota and permit ownership, 
National Standard Four does not apply.218  Similar to the justification 
made to avoid the referendum requirement, NMFS has stated that 
because the quota allocation is not made directly to the permit holder, no 
allocation of fishing privileges has been made, as required under 
National Standard Four.219  Further, NMFS justified the lack of allocation 
cap on the basis that consolidation does not amount to “compromising 
the diversity of the fleet” per se.220  That said, given that “sectors are 
primarily formed to realize efficiencies . . . out of consolidation or 
redistribution of sector vessel effort,”221 it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where intense allocation of quota does not compromise the 
diversity of the fleet.  
2.  The Common Pool Alternative 
Much of the justification for sectors is based on the voluntary nature 
of the program.222  Sector proponents note that rather than forcing an 
unwanted catch share program on to the fishery, the Council is providing 
fishermen with an alternative; thus, proponents tout this distinctive 
feature as an innovative way to reconcile the benefits of catch shares 
with divergent individual and community values.223  To be sure, by the 
letter of the law, sectors are voluntary.224  Individual fishermen choose 
whether or not to join the sector program; if they do not want to 
participate in the program, they may fish in the common pool, subject to 
the existing days-at-sea regulatory framework.225   
In practice, however, the common pool alternative exists as such in 
name only.  The low catch limits set under Amendment 16 provide a 
dramatic reduction in TAC and the deleterious effects of a combined 
input/output control management system are well known among New 
England fishermen.226  The fact that nearly ninety percent of active 
groundfish fishermen joined the sector program is indicative of this 
                                            
 217. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,295-96. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 18,296.  
 221. AMENDMENT 16 DEIS, supra note 167, at 124. 
 222. See, e.g., ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id. 
 225. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,275. 
 226. See supra Part II.A-B.   
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sentiment.227  Thus, regardless of the legal niceties of Amendment 16, the 
practical effect of the sector program is to implement a mandatory catch 
share regime on the fishery.  
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of this Comment’s criticisms of the sector program, this Part 
sets forth recommendations on how to improve both the current sector 
program and the national guidelines for catch shares under the MSRA.   
A.  Fixing the Sector Program 
The sector program was a carefully constructed solution to a 
complex set of legal requirements and regulatory deadlines.  Certainly, 
the sector program has elicited some immediate benefits and provides a 
unique framework from which to move forward.  However, the lack of 
anti-consolidation measures leaves the diversity of the groundfish fishery 
at risk and increases the likelihood of the fishery realizing exacting social 
and economic costs as a result.  The lack of protective measures within 
the sector program is inapposite with the express intent of Congress, 
expressed in section 303A of the MSRA, to establish such measures.  
Moreover, protecting the diversity of the fishery is mandated by the 
current FMP and is important to the economic, biologic, and cultural 
survival of the fishery.228  Fortunately, the solution is not difficult: the 
Council should amend the groundfish FMP to include caps on quota 
allocation and impose a limit on cost-recovery.  Doing so will temper the 
pace of consolidation and allow for a more diverse fishery.  
B.  Improving Section 303A 
1.  Repealing the Referendum Requirement 
Congress enacted section 303A with the specific intent of protecting 
the interests of fishermen and fishing communities from the adverse 
social and economic effects of catch share programs.229  However, the 
New England referendum requirement—a provision enacted to quell the 
fears of the most ardent catch share opponents, New England 
                                            
 227. See Quimby, supra note 188. 
 228. See supra Part III.C.  
 229. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(5)(b) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 5018, at 31-51 (2006); S. REP. 
NO. 109-229, at 26-47 (2006). 
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fishermen—produced an outcome contrary to congressional intent.  As 
demonstrated by the Amendment 16 process, the referendum 
requirement steered the Council towards a catch share program that 
provided decidedly less protection to fishermen.    
For that reason, the outcome of the Amendment 16 process has 
important implications for other New England fisheries.  While the 
groundfish fishery is the first major New England fishery to adopt a 
catch share program, it is unlikely to be the last.  Thus, Congress should 
repeal the referendum requirement under section 303A.  Doing so will 
afford the Council the flexibility to enact a catch share program that best 
suits the fishery at hand while ensuring the protective benefits of section 
303A.  The Amendment 16 process has demonstrated that the desired 
result of the referendum—protection of the interests of stakeholders in 
the fishery—will not be the final outcome.  Instead, the referendum 
requirement undermines the broader purpose of section 303A. 
2.  Broadening the Scope of Section 303A 
At the national level the Amendment 16 process raises an interesting 
question: was the bind placed on the Council—a bind caused by a 
combination of regulatory imposed deadlines, historic overfishing, and a 
New England specific referendum requirement—a unique circumstance?  
That is, will the circumstances that befell the New England Council 
reappear in the future?  The question is a compelling one, and one that is 
difficult to predict.  On the other hand, it is possible to look at what sort 
of precedent the Amendment 16 process will set for future Regional 
Fishery Management Councils, and that precedent is a dangerous one.  
Congress enacted section 303A to balance the benefits of catch share 
programs with the reoccurring negative socioeconomic impacts.  The 
sector program is unquestionably a catch share.  Quota is allocated to 
groups of fishermen, who are then able to fish, buy, and sell that quota.  
Yet, by the simple fact that the quota and permit are separated—as a 
matter of law but not practice—the sector program is not subject to the 
protective measures of section 303A.  Thus, sectors establish a precedent 
of evading hard-fought statutory requirements through the use of clever 
legal construction.  Therefore, Congress should broaden the definition of 
limited access privilege program and IFQ to include quota that is 
allocated to groups of permit-holders, such as sectors.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Fisheries management is evolving and the use of market-based 
management approaches will continue to play a significant role in that 
development.  As a result, the debate over catch share programs, and 
how to mitigate their potential downsides, is likely to continue.  The 
issues are complex and there appears to be no easy answer.  Sectors have 
been offered as an innovative solution—an attempt to ameliorate the 
socioeconomic ills that often accompany market-based management 
programs by shifting much of the decision-making authority from the 
government onto the fishermen.  A closer inspection of the sector 
program, however, reveals that sectors are an inadequate answer to a 
complicated question.  In crafting the sector program, the Council 
devolved too much authority to the sectors, leaving the fishery 
vulnerable to excessive allocation of quota and consolidation.   
Yet the sector program can still prove instructive.  Congress can 
view the Amendment 16 process as a signal that their efforts to create a 
national set of guidelines for catch share programs is incomplete.  By 
broadening the scope of section 303A, Congress can ensure that all catch 
share programs are subject to the protective safeguards of the MSRA.  
Likewise, by removing the referendum requirement from section 303A, 
Congress can eliminate the perverse incentive created by the provision, 
and force the Council to comply with the national guidelines.   
  
